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FED ERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION, dba FEDERATED
CAPITAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20140570-CA

vs.
ARNELLA M. ABRAHAM, individually
and dba WESTSTAR PROPERTIES, INC.,
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

****
ARGUMENT

I.

ABRAHAM CONFUSES RULE 12(b), WHICH ALLOWS CERTAIN
DEFENSES TO BE RAISED IN A MOTION TO DISMISS, WITH RULE
8(c), THAT REQUIRES A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE TO BE
RAISED IN THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING

Abraham's apparent assertion that all defenses may be raised by "answer, motion
~

or demand" is contrary to Rule 8( c) that specifically requires a statute of limitations
defense to be raised "in a responsive pleading." See Aplee. Br. at 12, citing Royal Res.,

Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979).

It is true that certain defenses may be raised by answer, some by motion, and some
by demand, and if not properly raised, such defenses are waived. This does not mean,
however, that all affirmative defenses may be raised by motion.
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Defenses that may be raised by motion are found in Rule 12(b).

Rule 12(b)

provides in pertinent part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required,
except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader
be made by motion: ( 1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, ( 5) insufficiency of service of process, (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure
to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted.

~

U.R.C.P. 12(b) (emphasis added). Thus, before a responsive pleading is filed, certain
defenses set forth in Rule l 2(b )( 1) - (7) may be made by motion.
Rule 8( c) provides in pertinent part:
A party must set forth affirmatively in a responsive pleading accord
and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
comparative fault, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure
of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance
or affirmative defense.
U.R.C.P. 8(c) (emphasis added). Thus, along with other enumerated defenses, a statute
of limitations defense "must" be raised "in a responsive pleading."
Rule l 2(h) provides, "A party waives all defenses . . . not presented either by
motion or by answer or reply .... " U.R.C.P. 12(h). In other words, some defenses may be
raised by motion or by answer or reply. This does not void Rule 8(c)'s requirement that
enumerated affirmative defenses, including a statute of limitations defense, must be
raised "in a responsive pleading," meaning an answer or reply.
2
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The cases cited by Abraham do not void the requirements found in Rules 8( c) and
Vil

9(i) that a statute of limitations defense must be specifically raised in the pleading
("referring to or describing the statute by section number, subsection designation, if any,
or designating the provision relied on sufficiently to identify it") or it is waived. See
U.R.C.P. 9(i).
In Royal Resources, the Court stated in relevant part, "The defense of election of
remedies is an affirmative one and must be raised by way of answer, motion, or
demand .... " See Royal Res., Inc., 603 P.2d at 796 (citing U.R.C.P. 8(b) and (c); U.R.C.P.
12(a), (b), and (c); and Costello v. Kasteler, 324 P.2d 772 (1958)). Rules 8(b) and (c)
require certain affirmative defenses be raised in a pleading or they are waived; Rules
12(a), (b), and (c) provide the relevant requirements of presenting a defense in a motion
before a responsive pleading is filed; and Costello provides that an election of remedies
defense may be brought by way of demand. Because election of remedies is not listed as

~

a defense that must be raised in a pleading, or may be raised by motion, Royal Resources
cannot properly be construed to mean that a statute of limitations defense may be raised
by motion. As shown above, Rule 8(c) and 9(i) are to the contrary.

~

Likewise, Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82, 109 P.3d 393, which
merely quotes the same language previously set forth in Royal Resources, does not void
the requirements set forth in Rules 8(c) and 9(i) that a statute of limitations defense must
be specifically pleaded. See Yazd, 2005 UT App 82, at, 7, n. 2.
Moreover, the election of remedies doctrine is different in nature than a statute of
limitations defense. A specific statute of limitations defense is potentially dispositive of a

~

3
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claim, and it is waived if not raised by pleading. On the other hand, an election of
remedies is not dispositive in nature, but rather is used to compel a party to choose

~

between various possible remedies, and it can be asserted by pleading, motion, or
demand. See Royal Res., Inc., 603 P.2d at 796.
GDE Construction Inc. v. Leavitt, 2012 UT App 298, 294 P.3d 567, helps clarify

that some defenses may be raised by motion and some by pleading. This Court observed,
"Normally, a party waives all defenses not raised in a responsive pleading, such as an
answer or reply." Id. at 1 13 (citation omitted). This Court recognized that "[s]ubject to
exceptions inapplicable here, defenses not properly pleaded are waived." Id. This Court
then cited Rule 12(h), which provides that certain defenses can be brought by motion. Id.
Thus, the apparent exception to the rule that defenses not properly pleaded are waived,
are those defenses brought by motion under Rule 12(b).
Abraham also confuses the definition of "pleading" and "motion" as she asserts on
pages 14 and 22 of her brief that she raised the specific statute of limitations defense for
the first time in her "summary judgment pleadings" filed with the court. See Aplee. Br.
at 14, 22 (emphasis added). But a "pleading" and a "motion" are not the same. Rule 7(a)
sets forth the definition of what constitutes "pleadings," and a motion for summary
judgment is not a pleading. The relevant "pleading" in this case is Abraham's Answer,
which was filed in the district court on February 24, 2012. (R. 102-04). Abraham did not
raise the specific statute of limitations defense in her Answer, in violation of Rules 8(c)
and 9(i).

4
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The cases cited to by Abraham should be read in light of the plain language of
vi

Rules 8( c), 9(i), l 2(b) and (c ), as well as case law clearly holding that a statute of
limitations defense must be pleaded with specificity or it is waived. See, e.g., Wasatch

Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007, 1011, fn. 5 (Utah 1970) ("It has been uniformly
held as the law of this state that the applicable section of the statute of limitations must be
specifically pleaded."). These Rules and the cases cited by Federated Capital establish
that under Utah law, the statute of limitations must be specifically pleaded or such
defense is waived. No Utah case holds that a statute of limitations defense that was not
specifically pleaded can be raised for the first time in a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment.
That Abraham waived the statute of limitations defense and that Abraham could
',,(fl

not raise this defense for the first time in her motion for summary judgment should have
been obvious to the district court, and it was plain error to grant Abraham's motion for
~

summary judgment.
II.

CHENEYv. RUCKER FAILS TO SUPPORT ABRAHAM'S ARGUMENT
THAT SHE WAS ENTITLED TO RAISE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
DEFENSE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HER MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Abraham relies on Cheney v. Rucker, 3 81 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963 ), to assert that "the

plain mandate of justice" allows the statute of limitations defense to be specifically raised
for the first time in a motion for summary judgment. See Aplee. Br. at 12-14. But

Cheney actually supports the well-settled law that the procedural statute of limitations
defense must be raised by pleading. Abraham ignores the distinction between a statute of

5
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limitations affirmative defense, which is procedural, with a factual affirmative defense
such as a subsequent agreement, which is substantive.
In Cheney v. Rucker, the parties entered into a commission agreement. 3 81 P .2d at
88. Two days later, the parties entered into another contract detailing the manner of
payment. Id. Two weeks later, the parties entered into a third agreement relating to the
commissions, which superseded and replaced the prior contracts. Id. at 88-89.

The

account was subsequently assigned to the plaintiff, who brought suit to recover the
commissions, but the plaintiff did not limit his claim to the agreed-upon amount in the
third agreement, but rather asked for the commission price from the first agreement. Id.
at 89.
Defendant failed to raise the third agreement in his responsive pleading as an
affirmative defense, but instead offered the third agreement as evidence at trial. Cheney,
381 P.2d at 91. Plaintiff objected under Rule 8(c) because defendant failed to raise the
issue as an affirmative defense. Id. The trial court received the third agreement over

~

plaintiffs objection, and entered its ruling based on the third agreement. Id. at 88.
On appeal, plaintiff again asserted that Rule 8( c) should have prevented the third
~

agreement from being admitted as evidence because defendant did not plead the
subsequent agreement as an affirmative defense. Id. at 91. The Utah Supreme Court
noted that Rule 8( c) "requires that affirmative defenses be pleaded", but the Court noted
this rule was a "procedural point" and is "not the only rule in the book of Rules of Civil
Procedure." Id. The Court observed that the rules "must all be looked to in the light of
their even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the

6
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end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Id. The Court continued, "Our rules
provide for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon
the controversy .... " Id. The Court found that under "the plain mandate of justice", the
trial court was required to admit evidence of the third and controlling agreement. Id.
Thus, the Court in Cheney correctly refused to allow the substantive factual issue
of the existence of a binding third agreement to be trumped by the procedural point that
Rule 8( c) requires affirmative defenses to be raised by pleading. Id. at 91.
The procedural issues in this case are different from the substantive factual issues
presented in Cheney. Abraham herself pointed out below that "[s]tatutes of limitations
are procedural laws." (R. 135, citing Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 870 (Utah App.
1994)). Here, Abraham raised for the first time in her motion for summary judgment the
procedural issue that Federated Capital's claims should be dismissed because it was not
~

brought within the four-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations. (R. 135).

Thus,

Abraham moved for summary judgment to dismiss Federated Capital's factual claims on
the procedural issue that Federated Capital missed a prescribed procedural filing
v9

deadline.
Now that Federated Capital has argued that Abraham herself missed the prescribed
procedural filing deadline to raise her specific statute of limitations defense, Abraham
uses Cheney to assert that the "plain mandate of justice" allows her to raise a procedural
issue for the first time in a motion for summary judgment, or else she would not be

vi)

7
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"afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions [she has] pertaining
to [the] dispute." See Aplee. Br. at 13, quoting Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91.
But the court in Cheney allowed a substantive factual affirmative defense to be
admitted over the procedural requirement of Rule 8(c). Id. at 91. Unlike Cheney, the
issue before this Court is a procedural affirmative defense, not a substantive factual
affirmative defense.

It is Federated Capital that has been denied the opportunity to

present its "legitimate contentions" and the "examination into" the factual issues to the
court, because the trial court allowed Abraham to untimely raise the procedural statute of
limitations defense for the first time in her motion for summary judgment. Thus, Cheney
does not support Abraham's assertion that she will be denied the opportunity to raise
legitimate issues if this Court overturns the district court.

Nor does Cheney support

Abraham's assertion that she can assert the procedural statute of limitations defense for
the first time in a motion for summary judgment.
Abraham waived her procedural statute of limitations defense when she failed to
specifically plead this defense.

III.

FEDERATED CAPITAL DID NOT INVITE THE DISTRICT COURT'S
ERROR

Abraham misapplies Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT App 41, 164 P.3d 366, when
asserting that Federated Capital "affirmatively" invited the error by not objecting to an
issue that was not raised in the trial court. See Aplee. Br. at 15, 17. A party does not
"invite error" by merely failing to object to an issue raised by the other side. Rather,
"invited error generally occurs in a more affirmative manner, such as where counsel

8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

stipulates to the court's instruction, states directly that there is no objection to a specific
~

ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous authority upon which the court
relies." Pratt, 2007 UT App 41 at ,r 23.

Pratt references three cases where counsel made affirmative representations that
were properly characterized as "leading the court into error." In the first case, despite
defense counsel confirming on the record it had no objections to the disputed jury
instructions, the defendant argued on appeal that instructions given to the jury were
prejudicial. See Pratt, 2007 UT App 41 at

,r

19 (citing State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ,r

55, 70 P.3d 111 ). In the second case, defense counsel twice made affirmative
representations to the trial court that he had no objections to the selected jury panel. See

Pratt, 2007 UT App 41 at ,r 20 (citing State v. King, 2006 UT 3,

,r,r 7-8,

131 P.3d 202).

In the third case, defense counsel provided the trial court with bad case law regarding
excluding evidence of a prior conviction when convincing the trial court to grant a
motion in limine. But defense counsel took issue when the trial court reversed its pretrial
ruling and allowed evidence of the prior conviction to be used against the defendant, and
vi

defense counsel asserted the defendant would not have taken the stand but for the pretrial
ruling. See Pratt, 2007 UT App 41 at

,r,r

21-22 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,

1220-21 (Utah 1993)). In all three cases, the parties took affirmative steps implicating
the invited error doctrine.
In this case, Federated Capital did not take any affirmative steps to mislead the
trial court into error. There was no direct stipulation to the specific statute of limitations
defense being raised for the first time in the motion for summary judgment, no statement

vj

9
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that it had no objection to a specific ruling of the court, and no authority provided that
could have mislead the court. Thus, Federated Capital did not invite the district court's

~

error.
IV.

THE CASES RELIED UPON BY FEDERATED CAPITAL ESTABLISH
THE COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR

Federated Capital cited Pepperwood Homeowners Ass 'n v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App
137, 351 P.3d 844, for the principle that Abraham was required to establish on summary
judgment that she properly raised the specific statute of limitations defense in her
Answer, and that "the rules of civil procedure allow entry of summary judgment against a
defaulted party only if appropriate." See Aplt. Br. at 12-13 (citing Mitchell, 2015 UT
App 13 7 at

1 6).

The district court is in fact tasked with the burden to "determine

whether the moving party's pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate its
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law." Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137 at 16.
Instead of distinguishing these points, Abraham asserts she "presented every fact
in her pleadings, discovery and declarations necessary to show" that Federated Capital's
claim was not filed within four years. See Aplee. Br. at 18. The issue though, is not
whether Federated Capital filed its Complaint within a four-year deadline. The issue is
whether Abraham was entitled to summary judgment, and she could only be entitled to
summary judgment if she properly asserted the specific statute of limitations defense in
her Answer. Abraham did not raise the specific statute of limitations defense in her
Answer and the trial court committed plain error by granting summary judgment.
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~

Abraham also attempts to distinguish Wasatch Mines Co. by asserting it does not
~

apply because Abraham "set forth in detail in her summary judgment [motion] 1 the
grounds for dismissal based on the Pennsylvania four year statute of limitations." See
Aplee. Br. at 22. Abraham then relies on the sole dissenting opinion, which cites Rule 1
that pleadings "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action," and Rule 8(f) that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as
to do substantial justice." Id. at 22-23 (citing Wasatch Mines Co., 465 P.2d at 1012).
Abraham, however, is not seeking "substantial justice." Abraham is seeking her

~

version of procedural justice. As set forth above, a statute of limitations defense is a
procedural defense, not a substantive defense. It does not go to the merits of a claim.
The merits or substance of the claim is whether Abraham did not pay its debts.
Abraham could have raised the specific statute of limitations defense in her
Answer, as required by Rules 8(c) and 9(i). Abraham chose not to do so, and instead,

lJ

before even filing her Answer, she filed a Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction. (R. 18-37). This motion was fully litigated, as Federated Capital
filed an Objection and Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R. 77-83), Abraham
filed a Reply Memorandum (R. 90-98), and the district court held a hearing and issued a
ruling denying Abraham's motion. (R. 101).

~

After losing her motion to dismiss, Abraham filed her Answer and did not
specifically plead the statute of limitations affirmative defense. (R. 103).

vJ
1

Abraham erroneously labelled her motion for summary judgment as a "summary
judgment pleading". See Aplee. Br. at 22.
11
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Abraham herself prolonged the litigation and increased attorney's fees by filing a
motion to dismiss, filing an Answer that did not properly raise the specific statute of
limitations defense, and then filing a motion for summary judgment that inappropriately
raised the specific statute of limitations defense for the first time. Abraham herself did
not follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and she waived her statute of limitations
defense.

Wasatch Mines Co. is directly on point. There, the defendant untimely raised the
specific statute of limitations defense for the first time at trial. See Wasatch Mines Co.,
465 P.2d at 1012. Despite the fact that the statute of limitations was only raised generally
in the pleadings, the trial court held that the claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. at 1008. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that
the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, finding that defendant's "general plea
of the statute of limitations was not in accordance with Rule 9(h) .... " 2 Id. at 1010-11.
Abraham waived her statute of limitations defense by failing to plead with

~

specificity, and the district court committed plain error by granting the motion for
summary judgment.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in the opening brief, Federated
Capital respectfully requests reversal of summary judgment.

2

The current rule is now found at Rule 9(i).
12
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